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Abstract 
How to compare cultures? The case of historical thinking 
Comparative studies in historiography are rare. In most cases 
authors use a pre-given idea of the essentials of historical 
thinking and historiography to compare Western with non-
Western phenomena in the field of historical representation in 
general, and historiography in particular. This approach to 
comparison is very problematic since the presupposed 
paradigm of historiography is an abstraction in the Western 
tradition. As a consequence this comparison brings about 
knowledge on non-Western historical thinking and historio-
graphy in so far as it is similar to or different from the Western 
one. Difference normally imply deviation or a lack of historicity. 
However, comparing Western historiography with Chinese 
historiography, does not bring about such a big difference as we 
witness in the case of for example India. Nevertheless, a 
cultural bias in the comparative work exists that makes the 
results of comparative work problematic. 
The article proposes a theoretical means of intercultural 
comparison that is grounded in a general theory of historical 
thinking, presented in the form of its matrix. This matrix is 
explicated, discussed and differentiated into a set of items 
which can be used as criteria of comparison.  
                                          
1 Jörn Rüsen is an extraordinary professor in the School of Basic Sciences, 
North-West University. He is also president of the Institute for Advanced Study 
in the Humanities in Essen, Germany. 
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Opsomming 
Hoe om kulture te vergelyk? Die kwessie van historiese denke 
Vergelykende studies in historiografie is skaars. In die meeste 
gevalle gebruik outeurs ’n voorafgegewe idee van wat beskou 
word as die essensie van historiese denke en historiografie. 
Daardeur word dan gepoog om Westerse en nie-Westerse 
verskynsels te vergelyk. Dit is veral die geval op die terrein van 
historiese representasie in die algemeen en historiografiese 
denke in die besonder. Hierdie benaderingswyse is proble-
maties. Die vooropgestelde historiografiese paradigma is ge-
woonlik ’n abstraksie van die Westerse tradisie. Omdat die 
vooropgestelde paradigma gevolglik ’n abstrahering van die 
Westerse tradisie verteenwoordig, dra dit by tot kennis van nie-
Westerse historiese denke en historiografie in soverre dit van 
die Westerse tradisie verskil. Verskil impliseer gewoonlik ’n 
afwyking of ’n gebrek aan historisiteit. Die verskil tussen 
Westerse en Chinese historiografie blyk gering te wees 
wanneer dit teen die agtergrond van byvoorbeeld die Indiese 
geskiedenis beskou word. Tog bestaan daar ’n kulturele 
voorkeur in vergelykende werk. Die resultate van vergelykende 
werk het gevolglik ’n problematiese aard.  
In die artikel word ’n teoretiese strategie aan die hand gedoen 
om interkulturele vergelyking wat gebaseer is op ’n algemene 
teorie van historiese denke te bewerkstellig. Hierdie strategie 
word uiteengesit in die vorm van ’n matriks wat verduidelik en 
bespreek word.  Voorstelle word ook gemaak aangaande ’n 
gedifferensieerde stel kriteria wat vir vergelykingsdoeleindes 
gebruik kan word. 
1. Introduction: Comparison as a matter of theory 
Most works on historiography are done within the framework of a 
national history (Blanke, 1991). A broader perspective is related to 
European or Western historiography (Breisach, 1983; Iggers, 1993; 
Iggers & Parker, 1979) or to the historiography of non-Western 
cultures. The latter mainly deals with a specific country or a specific 
culture like China (Beasley & Pulleyblank, 1962; Gardner, 1961; 
Kao, 1982; Trauzettel 1984) or India (Devahuti, 1979; Asthana, 
1992, Gottlob, 1995:123-144). Comparative studies are rare (Brown, 
1988; Küttler, Rüsen & Schulin, 1993a and Rüsen 1993b, 1994, 
1996, 1997, 1999). There are a lot of reasons why comparative 
studies are rarely undertaken: only two of them will be mentioned:  
• The difficulty of combining the competencies of research in 
different historical cultures and  
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• the dominance of Western historical thinking in historical studies 
– even in non-Western countries. This dominance draws 
academic attention to the origins and development of 
specificically the contemporary way of historical thinking. 
On the other hand a growing need for intercultural comparison exists 
– simply and unavoidably because of the increasing growth of 
international and intercultural communication, not only in economics 
and politics, but also in various fields of cultural life. 
1.1 Intercultural comparison needs an organisational 
paramenter 
Thus the following question arises: How should such an intercultural 
comparison be undertaken (cf. Osterhammel, 1996:143-164; Haupt 
& Kocka, 1996)? It is not sufficient to combine different histories of 
historiography. This method may be a useful and even necessary 
way to get an overview of the hitherto available knowledge, but it is 
no comparison whatsoever, since the different stocks of knowledge 
lack a common framework of cognitive organisation. Every com-
parison needs an organising parameter. Before looking at the 
materials (texts, oral traditions, images, rituals, monuments, me-
morials, etcetera), one needs to know what realm of things should 
be taken into consideration and in what respect the findings in this 
realm should be compared. To put it more simply: We should ask for 
corresponding facts and conformities and find out the differences in 
the field of historiography.  
This simple starting point entails a very complex way of answering it. 
Intercultural comparison of cultural issues is a very sensitive matter 
– it touches the field of cultural identity, and it is therefore involved in 
the struggle for power and domination among different countries, 
especially in respect to Western dominance and non-Western 
resistance on practically all levels of intercultural relationship. It is, 
however, not only a political struggle for power that renders the field 
of historical thinking in intercultural comparison problematic. Beyond 
politics there is an epistemological difficulty with enormous 
conceptual and methodological consequences for the humanities: 
Every comparison is done in the context of a pre-given culture; thus 
the context is involved in the subject matter of the comparison itself. 
Looking at historical thinking in other cultures with a historical 
interest is normally undertaken with a concept of historiography, pre-
given by the cultural background of the scholar. As a historian he or 
she knows what historiography is and therefore has no urgent 
reason to reflect or explicate it theoretically. This pre-given 
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knowledge of what historiography is, functions as a hidden 
parameter, as a norm, or, at least, as a unit of structuring the outlook 
on the variety of historical thinking in different places and times.  
Non-awareness of what historiography entails offers a problem: In a 
comparison a single case of historical thinking has an unreflected 
meta-status, and it is therefore more than only a matter of 
comparison, it pre-shapes its results: the ’real’ or the essentially 
’historical’ mode of historiography naturally can only be found in this 
pre-given paradigm, and the other modes get their meaning, 
significance and importance only in relation to it.2 Comparison in this 
respect is nothing but measuring the proximity or distance from the 
pre-supposed norm. In most cases this norm is the mode of one’s 
own historical thinking, of course. In other rarer cases the scholar 
may use projections of alternatives into other cultures in order to 
criticise his or her own point of view; but even in this case he or she 
never gets a substantial insight into the peculiarities and the 
similarities of different modes of historical thinking and historio-
graphy.  
1.2 A theory of comparison implies reflection, explication and 
discussion  
There is no way of avoiding the clashes between involvement and 
interest concerning the historical identity of the people whose 
historiography must and should be compared. This involvement and 
interest have to be systematically taken into consideration. They 
require reflection, explication and discussion. There is, at least, one 
way of doing so and this way creates the opportunity to reach 
comprehensive insights and cognition, and potential agreement and 
consensus among those who feel committed to, or, at least, related 
to the different cultures in concern. This way of doing implies theory, 
i.e. a certain way of reflecting and explicating the concepts and 
strategies of comparison. Only by theoretically explicit reflection the 
standards of comparison can be treated in a way that prevents any 
                                          
2 A typical example is Brown (1988). Rosenthal’s (1968:17) views reflect the 
problem when dealing with the subject matter of ’Muslim historiography’: He 
identifies it as ”those works which Muslims, at a given moment of their literary 
history, considered historical works and which, at the same time, contain a 
reasonable amount of material which can be classified as historical according to 
our definition of history...”. 
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hidden cultural imperialism or misleading perspective or, at least, it 
may be corrected.3
An intercultural comparison pre-supposes cultures as the subject 
matter of its work. It is an open question how these units of 
comparison should be looked at. Are there pre-given entities, well 
distinguished in time and space? If an intercultural comparison uses 
a theoretical framework, it has to be very careful not to start from 
pre-suppositions that are problematic. This problem can be easily 
indicated in respect to the sense-criteria that constitute historical 
thinking in general. These sense criteria form an essential part of a 
cultural code which defines the units of comparison. Consequently 
cultures can be compared along the line of their fundamental 
concepts which define the forms and realms of reality and human 
self-understanding. Such a typology of a conceptualisation is a very 
useful theoretical means for a comparative approach.  
1.3 Dangers of a theory of cultural differences 
Yet, the danger of such a theory of cultural differences lies in its 
tendency to substantiate or even reify the specific cultures 
concerned. Their internal historicity, their manifold interferences and 
mutual conditioning are lost from sight. Comparison is only a 
statement of dichotomy or of clear alternatives: Historical thinking 
either follows this code or another one. The related forms of cultural 
identities look like special realms with clear borderlines. Nothing 
seems to exist beyond or across the single codes. The typology 
itself, however, transgresses this borderline in a decisive step and 
indicates a mode of thinking, which does not necessarily follow one 
cultural code different from the others. A typology of cultural 
differences is methodically necessary as a hypothetical construct, 
but it has to avoid the constraints and misleading views of a concept 
of cultures as pre-given units and entities. 
The idea of cultures as being pre-given is committed to a cultural 
logic which constitutes identity on the fundamental difference 
between inside and outside. Such logic conceptualises identity as a 
mental territory with clear borderlines and a corresponding 
relationship between self- and otherness as being strictly divided 
and only externally interrelated. This logic is essentially ethnocentric, 
and ethnocentrism is inscribed into a typology of cultural differences 
                                          
3 I tried a first approach to such a theoretisation for the sake of an intercultural 
comparison (concerning the history of human rights) in Rüsen (1994:168-187). 
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that treats cultures as coherent units which can clearly be separated 
from one another.  
1.4 Cultural specifics 
I would like to propose a method of using theoretical con-
ceptualisation which avoids the already mentioned ethnocentrism. 
Ethnocentrism is theoretically dissolved if the specifics of a culture 
are understood as a combination of elements which are shared by 
all other cultures. Thus the specifics of cultures are brought about by 
different constellations of the same elements. The theoretical 
approach to cultural differences which is guided by the idea of 
cultural specifics does not fall into the trap of ethnocentrism. Cultural 
specifics on the contrary  
• presents the otherness of different cultures as a mirror which 
allows a better self-understanding;  
• it does not exclude otherness, when one culture constitutes the 
peculiarity of itself, but it keeps it included;  
• it brings about a balanced interrelationship of cultures: The 
people who have to deal with their differences from others 
become empowered with recognition and acknowledgement.  
2. The matrix of historical thinking 
So far my argumentation in which culture is referred to, has been a 
very general one. It speaks of culture in principle. My subject matter, 
however, is history. I thus have to specify my idea of culture as an 
idea of what history is about in all cultures and how this idea can be 
worked out as a methodical means of intercultural comparison. 
2.1 A logic of historical thinking 
The theoretical approach I would like to propose lies on a level of 
discourse which can be described as ’metahistorical’. This discourse 
reflects history and its various modes of dealing with the past; it is 
not a mode of this dealing but a theory about it. The main issue of 
this discourse concerns is the sense-criteria which were used to give 
the past its specific historical meaning and significance for the 
present. Additionally the constitutive role of needs and interests in 
dealing with the past and the function of remembering in orienting 
human activity and of forming all kinds of identity are of constitutive 
importance in this field.  
Jörn Rüsen 
Koers 70(2) 2005:265-286  273 
The specific logic of historical thinking cannot be explicated without 
systematically taking into account its constitution and function in 
practical human life since it is constituted by its relationship to the 
cultural needs of human activities. It is one of the most important 
merits of the topical discussion on historical memory to illuminate 
this point: Historical thinking takes place in the realm of memory and 
is committed to its mental procedures by which the recalling and 
representation of the past are dedicated to the cultural orientation of 
human life in the present. Recalling of the past is a necessary 
condition of furnishing human life with a cultural frame of orientation 
that opens up a future perspective, grounded on the experience of 
the past.  
The explication of the logic of historical thinking can be done in the 
form of a scheme, which explicates five principles of historical 
thinking and their systematic relationship (Rüsen, 2001:43-105; 
Rüsen 2004). (See Fig. 1.)  
The five principles are:  
• interests in cognition generated out of needs for orientation in the 
temporal change of the present world;  
• concepts of significance and perspectives of temporal change, 
within which the past gets its specific feature as “history”; 
• rules or methods (in a broad sense of the word) of treating the 
experience of the past;  
• forms of representation, in which the experience of the past, 
brought about by interpretation into the concepts of significance, 
is presented in the form of a narrative; and 
• functions of cultural orientation in the form of a temporal direction 
of human activities and concepts of historical identity.  
2.2 The sense-criterion governs the relationship between past 
and present 
Each of these five factors is necessary and all of them together are 
sufficient in constituting historical thinking as a rationally elaborated 
form of historical memory. (It may be useful to underline that not 
every memory in itself is already a historical one. “Historical” 
indicates a certain element of temporal distance between past and 
present, which makes a complex mediation of both necessary.) The 
five factors may change in the course of time, i.e. in the 
development of historical thinking in general and historical studies in 
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specific. The relationship between these five factors, the systematic 
order in which they are dependent on one another will, however, 
remain the same. In this systematic relationship all of them depend 
upon one main and fundamental principle, which gives their 
relationship its coherence and the characteristics which historical 
thinking has in the variety of historical change and development. 
This main and fundamental principle is the sense-criterion, which 
governs the relationship between past and present, within which the 
past gets its significance as “history”. 
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2.3 Historical studies and its “scientific” status 
During most of the periods of its development in contemporary times 
historical studies mainly reflected the cognitive dimension of itself on 
the level of metahistory. It was eager to legitimate its “scientific” 
status and its claims for truth and objectivity, thus participating in the 
cultural prestige of “science” as the most convincing form, in which 
knowledge and cognition can serve human life. This reflection has 
been done in a broad variety of different conceptualisations of this 
“scientific character”. In most of these manifestations historical 
studies claimed for itself a certain epistemological and methodo-
logical autonomy in the field of academic disciplines. Doing so, it 
remained aware of some non-cognitive elements still valid and 
influential in the work of historical studies – particularly in the field of 
writing history. Only after the linguistic turn these elements and 
factors were, however, seen as being as important as the cognitive 
ones.  
The importance of these additional elements and factors can be 
made plausible in the proposed structure of the five factors of 
historical thinking in general (and historical studies in particular), if 
one looks at specific interrelationships:4  
• The relationship between interest and concepts 
In the relationship between interest and concepts historical thinking 
takes place as a fundamental semantic discourse of symbolising 
time. Time is related to human activity and suffering in a meaningful 
and sense-bearing way. In this realm of the human mind 
fundamental criteria of meaning and sense of history are decided 
upon.  
• The relationship between concepts and methods 
In the relationship between concepts and methods historical thinking 
is mainly committed to a cognitive strategy of producing historical 
knowledge. (This strategy constitutes the “scientific” character of 
historical studies under certain conditions of modernity. It subjugates 
the discourse of history under the rules of methodical argument-
ation, conceptual language, control by experience and gaining 
consent and agreement by rational means.)  
                                          
4 My sincere thanks to Achim Mittag for a stimulating suggestion to complete my 
concept of this interrelationship. 
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• The relationship between methods and forms 
In the relationship between methods and forms an aesthetic strategy 
of historical representation takes place. Historical knowledge is 
shaped. In its form it becomes an element of cultural communication 
on the temporal dimension of human life. Knowledge of the past 
adopts the features of present-day life and is furnished with its 
forces to move the human mind.  
This communication is initiated within the interaction between the 
forms of representation and the functions of cultural orientation. In 
this respect historical thinking is ruled by a rhetorical strategy of 
offering cultural orientation.  
• The relationship between interests and functions 
Finally, in the relationship between interests and functions historical 
studies is committed to a political discourse of collective memory. It 
places the work of historians into the struggle of power and 
recognition and makes it a necessary means of legitimising or de-
legitimising all forms of domination and government. Taking all the 
strategies together, historical thinking can be made visible as a 
complex synthesis of dealing with the past in five different 
dimensions: semantics, cognition, aesthetics, rhetoric, and politics. 
This synthesis stand for an order of history as an integral part of 
culture. 
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1. Semantic discourse of symbolisation 
2. Cognitive strategy of producing historical knowledge 
3. Aesthetic strategy of historical representation  
4. Rhetorical strategy of offering historical orientation 
5. Political discourse of collective memory 
Matrix of historical thinking 
(Fig. 1) 
2.4 Proposed scheme: constitutive factors of historical 
thinking 
The proposed scheme of the constitutive factors of historical thinking 
shows the complexity of the work of historians. On the one hand, the 
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work of historians is influenced by and related to practical life; on the 
other hand it has its own realm of gaining knowledge beyond the 
practical purposes of life orientation. It makes plausible why history 
has always been rewritten – according to the changes in interests 
and functions of historical knowledge in human life – and why, at the 
same time, development, even progress in the cognitive strategy to 
obtain knowledge about the past is possible.  
As every scheme illuminates complex phenomena and at the same 
time takes parts of it beyond of our awareness, it should be briefly 
indicated that there are elements in dealing historically with the past 
that are not addressed by the proposed system of principles. Thus 
for example, in the realm of constitutive interests there is already an 
experience of the past. It is substantially different from the 
experience treated methodically in the realm of elaborated historical 
thinking. The past is already present when historical thinking starts 
with questions, initiated by needs for and interests in historical 
memory. The past plays an important role in shaping these interests 
and needs. This is the case in very different forms: as an effective 
tradition, as a fascination of alterity, as a traumatic pressure and 
even as forgetfulness, that, nevertheless, keeps the past alive by 
suppressing it. 
3. Criteria for intercultural comparison 
Along this line of argumentation it is now possible to list a series of 
points of view which can be used for intercultural comparison. The 
following items only have an illustrative function. It depends upon 
the materials to be compared which item is useful, which can be 
omitted, and which has still to be developed.5
• Interests: needs for orientation and perspectives 
Concerning the interests one has to look for needs for orientation 
and perspectives in which self and society may be seen in an overall 
meaningful order. Such an interest can inter alia be a “natural” 
interest in the continuation of cultural orientations; a ’natural’ 
intention of the human heart and soul, a need for the legitimisation 
of certain forms of life, of certain “belief systems” of political power, 
of social inequality, an interest in discontinuity, criticism, distinction 
                                          
5 The following list has been worked out in close cooperation with Horst Walter 
Blanke and Achim Mittag in their research project on comparing Western and 
Chinese historical thinking, funded by the Volkswagen-Foundation. 
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etc. In order to understand these interests and needs one can ask 
for challenges that arouse historical consciousness. Normally, the 
historical mind is basically negatively constituted, i.e. by experiences 
of ruptures, loss, and disorder; by experiences of structural defects 
and dissonances, of suffering, disaster, misfortune, domination, 
suppression, or by experiences of specific or accidental challenges, 
experiences of arbitrary occurrences and casual events. In this 
respect the horror of contingency takes place, a horror which has 
got the specific feature of a historical trauma in contemporary 
history. Other challenges can be the fascination with the past or 
experiences of encountering the Other. 
• Concepts and patterns of interpretation 
Concerning the concepts and patterns of interpretation, one has to 
look for sense criteria and leading views of the past by which past 
human affairs are transformed into history, i.e. the remembered past 
rendered meaningfully. Of highest importance are basic resources of 
sense and meaning (so-called “belief systems”). They decide about 
the ability of integrating “negative sense” and experiences of 
encountering the Other, the definitive zones of sense and meaning 
and the limit to which extent senselessness is allowed. They specify 
what is regarded as historical and what is subjected to 
historicisation. The whole field of the semantics of historical sense 
generation has to be taken into account: fundamental notions and 
concepts. They generate types of historical sense and meaning (like 
Nietzsche’s distinction between a monumental, antiquarian, and 
critical mode – Nietzsche, [1980]; or Rüsen’s typology of traditional, 
exemplary, critical, and genetic historical sense generation [Rüsen, 
1987:87-97; Rüsen, 1993a; Rüsen, 1989:35-60]; or Hayden White’s 
tropes of metaphor – metonymy – synecdoche – irony, constituting 
the meaning of a historical text [White, 1973]). Of special interest are 
topoi of historical narration and modes of argumentation like 
spontaneous and unsystematic, immanent (not reflective), and 
systematic (e.g. in the form of a philosophy of history). Time-
concepts (Rüsen, 2002:189-205) play a categorical role in 
interrelating the past, present, and future.  
• Procedures of interpretation, 
Concerning the procedures of interpretation, one has to look for 
mental operations, criteria of plausibility, rules of empirical research, 
modes of discourse (like monological or dialogical), types of 
rationality and argumentation, especially in the form of methods.  
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• Forms of representation 
Concerning the forms of representation one has to look for the 
aesthetic dimension of historical narrations, the media, forms of 
language and expression, differentiations of narrativity (e.g. 
narrative and non-narrative elements in historical representations). 
• Functions 
Concerning the functions, one has to look for the role historical 
representations play in the cultural orientation of human life. How 
does it enable people to come to terms with permanence and 
change? How does it refer to the legitimacy of political power? How 
does it address the intention of human action? Historical thinking is 
a necessary means to build, formulate and express one’s identity. 
Special attention thus needs to be given to this basic element of 
human culture, to the self-awareness of one’s own identity by 
encountering the other, to the range of collective identity as defining 
historical space, and to the relationship between universal and 
regional perspectives. 
There are still some items of comparison, beyond the field which is 
disclosed by the matrix of historical thinking, outlined above. They 
are related to the context within which historical thinking takes place. 
Finally some factors of this context are thus listed which influence or 
even determine the way history is brought about within the 
framework of its specific logic (as it is explicated by the matrix): 
types of conduct that presuppose some kind of historical sense-
making, especially to those that are related to the cultural memory, 
cultural practices of narrating, and the whole social network within 
which the historical discourse takes place. 
All the above-mentioned items simply are a collection within, and 
outside, the abstract systematic order of the matrix. They indicate 
what should be asked for and taken into account in intercultural 
comparison. 
4. Towards diachronic comparison 
An unsolved problem still exists: Historical thinking changes in the 
course of time; it has its own historicity. Can we develop a 
theoretical framework for comparing this change as well? Up to now 
most of the listed items of comparison can only serve for a 
synchronic approach. What about a diachronic approach? 
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Diachronic comparison is related to change in historiography. 
Theoretically undertaken, it has to identify comprehensive factors, 
modes of processes, and directions of change. Before explicating 
corresponding perspectives of change in historiography, a general 
periodisation should, however, be reflected within which historio-
graphy gets its historical significance related to the entire process of 
change in the human world. Such a periodisation realises the 
dependence of historiography on its context, by which it receives its 
constitutive challenges, its basic sense-criteria. In this respect it 
fulfils (or lacks) its orientational function. It is an intensively debated 
question whether the main epochs of European history could be 
applied to other cultures. If not, the different periodisations should, at 
least, be compared in respect to the criteria which determine the 
division of epochs. 
For the purposes of historiography a general periodisation which 
relates to the dominant media of human communication is useful. 
Nobody will deny that a distinction between the three epochs, which 
are defined by the three media orality, scribality, and “electronality”6 
may serve as a first approach to indicate a comprehensive 
perspective of cultural change.  
Coming closer to the specific development of historiography, one 
has to look at those factors and elements that cause change in the 
procedure of making sense and representing the past. To give one 
example for such a moving force of changing historiography, I would 
like to hint at the increase of knowledge of the past. Such knowledge 
can challenge new categorisations, and these new categorisations 
reshape and restructure historiography in general. Without the 
exploding increase of knowledge the rise of historicist thought in the 
late 18th century could not be sufficiently explained. There was a 
similar accumulation of historical knowledge in China, but it does not 
seem to have brought about a shift in the underlying categories of 
historical perception and interpretation. 
Another question is related to the presentation of change in historio-
graphy. Is there anything like the experience of progress, based 
upon self-esteem of a successful group the historiographers can 
associate with?  
                                          
6 Albert D’Haenens (Louvain la Neuve) once in a debate used the slogan oralité, 
scribalité, electronalité which I pick up here. 
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4.1 The direction of change 
The most important parameter of diachronic comparison is the 
direction of change. Is it possible to develop tendencies of change 
which comprehend different cultures? Today even this question is 
highly disregarded. It seems too much loaded with the ideological 
burden of Western supremacy. But a rejection of Western ideology 
should not lead to a prohibition of asking questions. I think that such 
a question is unavoidable, since all countries of the world today are 
directly or indirectly involved in the process of modernisation, and 
this modernisation is a challenge of historical identity for all of them. 
It is of high importance to know whether there are tendencies in 
one’s own cultural history which point into the same direction as the 
Western development. And for Westerners it is useful to know 
whether there are tendencies in non-Western cultures which have a 
similar direction of development as their own. If a cultural develop-
ment exists, or evolution, potentially involving all countries, then the 
modernisation process will be more than a mere threat of alienation. 
It may even be conceptualised as an opportunity of gaining or 
regaining one’s own identity in a broader perspective of humankind. 
4.2 No historiography without rationality  
Max Weber’s concept of universal rationalisation and dis-
enchantment should thus be reformulated as a question for a 
comparative analysis of historiography. There is no historiography 
without rationality, i.e. a set of rules, which bind the sense-making 
process of historical consciousness into strategies of con-
ceptualisation, of bringing empirical evidence into the representation 
of the past, and of coherent argumentation. This rationality should 
be reconstructed and investigated in respect to its development 
towards a growing universality of its validity. The same should be 
done in respect to the norms and values which constitute historical 
identity. Do they show a directed development which can be 
described as a process of universalisation, and does the spatial 
extension of historical identity develop accordingly? I think we can 
observe such a process of universalisation in many cultures:7 It 
started from a small social group in archaic times and has lead to 
mankind in contemporary history. Concomitantly with this univers-
alisation very often a corresponding regionalisation takes place. 
                                          
7 I tried to conceptualise such a process in respect of the issue of their 
universality of human rights and the general issues of humankind, selfness, and 
otherness (Schmale, 1993:28-46; see Rüsen, 1993:167-178). 
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Additionally one should look for a process of particularisation and 
individualisation; it may be a reaction to universalisation or a 
consequence of it. 
4.3 The treatment of “facts” in relationship to the pre-
supposed order of time  
Another direction of development can be conceptualised in respect 
to the treatment of “facts” in relationship to the presupposed order of 
time. Is there a comprehensive process of “positivation” of historio-
graphy by increasingly integrating positive facts and principles of 
temporal order? In archaic societies the “facts”, occurring in human 
life are not important for the narrative presentation of the divine 
order of the world in space and time. Myths as narratives, which 
present world order, are not very much related to chronologically 
fixed dates given and proved by empirical evidence. As a result of a 
long development the mythical order has vanished or has been 
mixed up with the temporal chain of positive, i.e. “factual” events and 
structures.  
Following this line of argument, I want to outline a periodisation 
which is basically related to the media of cultural communication and 
its transformation. This kind of periodisation may function as a 
heuristic and hypothetical means of giving historical thinking a 
comprehensive temporal order. It even indicates a possible develop-
ment (post-historic period), that presents an ideal-type, composed of 
the most challenging elements of postmodern historical thinking. 
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5. Universal periodisation of historical thinking8
   
P
re
-h
is
to
ric
 Sharp distinction between paradigmatic time of world order (“archaic” time of myth) and the time of every-day human life; the 
latter is meaningless for the order of the world and the self. 
Contingency is radically sorted out. Dominance of the traditional 
type of historical narration. Medium of oral tradition 
Intermediation 
of both 
“times”. Con-
tingent facts 
(events) are 
loaded with 
meaning con-
cerning the 
temporal world 
order. 
   
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
The entire order of time has a divine 
character. Religion is the main source for 
sense of temporal change. Dominance of 
the exemplary type of historical narration. 
   
H
is
to
ric
 
Contingency is 
recognised as 
relevant for 
this order and 
bound into a 
concept of 
time that 
orientates 
practical 
activity and 
forms human 
identity. 
Medium of 
scripture. 
   
M
od
er
n 
Minimalisation of transcendental 
dimension of time-order. The entire sense 
of history tends to become innerworldly. 
Human rationality is able to recognise it 
by means of methodical research of the 
empirical evidence of the past. 
Dominance of the genetic type of 
historical narration 
   
P
os
t-h
is
to
ric
 
No comprehensive order of time including past, present, and 
future. The past is separated into a time of itself. Facts of the past 
become elements of arbitrary constellations that have no 
substantial relationship to present and future. The human past 
becomes de-temporalised. Contingency loses its concept-
ualisation by ideas of temporal order valid for present-day life and 
its future. Medium of electronics. 
                                          
8 I arranged three of the four types of historical sense-making into a clear order of 
different periods. This categorisation is misleading, since the four types play a 
much more complex role in all periods. They nevertheless can be used to 
characterise an epoch-related kind of historical thinking. The different types are 
described in Rüsen (2004, footnote 15). 
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Modernisation is, of course, one of the most important perspectives 
of diachronic comparison. It should be concretised as an internal 
process of rationalisation in dealing with the past. Historical studies 
as an academic discipline indicate forms and stages of this 
rationalisation. Rationalisation, however, is only one side of the coin 
of modernisation. There is always a reaction against it, a re-
enchantment in the relationship to the past which, at least, 
compensates for the loss of sense and meaning brought about by 
the rationality of methodical strategies of research. The comparative 
approach to historiography thus should always be a double one: the 
view at disenchantment, as well as at its compensation by an 
irrational re-enchantment or at its complementation by new or 
reformulated (“reformatted”) sources and potentials of sense, 
meaning, and significance of the temporal dimension of human life. 
Another strong indicator of modernity is the emergence of the 
concept of “the history” as an entire field of human experience, as a 
temporal totality of development comprising all cultures of the past, 
present and future. 
6. Conclusion 
The twentieth century has brought about fundamental challenges of 
historiography in respect to its basic criteria of sense and meaning. 
In this respect I think of the traumatic experience of the Holocaust 
and similar occurrences of mass-murder and other radical irritations 
of sense in the course of time in the human world. (A Chinese 
example is at hand, too: The Taiping Rebellion e.g. had 20 million 
victims.) Such experiences cause traumatic reactions and very often 
suppress important elements of collective memory into the 
unconscious. Looking at historiography this unconscious has to be 
disclosed as a silence of the past, which, nevertheless, influences 
the present. In order to make this influence plausible, one has to 
identify indications of this suppression in the articulated represent-
ations of the past. In order to meet these challenges our inter-
pretation of historiography has to systematically take into account 
intended or unintended procedures of a negative mode of making 
sense of history. This negative sense or the sense of senselessness 
can be demonstrated as “limits of representation” that have already 
been paradigmatically discussed in respect to the Holocaust (Fried-
lander, 1992). It seems to be a fruitful quest to look for such limits 
even in ordinary historiography, thus bringing to our awareness a 
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dimension of historical consciousness in which historiography 
speaks the language of silence.9  
In the introductory remarks of this article I pointed out the fact that 
every work in historiography, including comparison, is involved in the 
process of identity formation and is guided by practical interests. 
This is true for the proposed strategy of pursuing comparative 
interpretation of historiography as well. The practical objective of this 
strategy is a negative and a positive one.  
• Negatively, this practical objective should prevent ideological 
generalisations of cultural peculiarity becoming presuppositions 
and guidelines for the study of historiography, thus avoiding the 
widespread dichotomy between self and other and the related 
strategy of exclusion in identity-formation.  
• Positively, this objective should enable scholars to present the 
historiographical traditions of different cultures, peoples and 
societies in a mental movement between sameness and 
difference, by which those whose identity is at stake, are put into 
the position of becoming aware that otherness is a mirror for their 
self-awareness. Then their communication can become an effort 
of mutual recognition and acknowledgement (Rüsen, 2002). 
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